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LYNCH v. DONNELLY: HAS THE LEMON TEST SOURED?
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment states, in part, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' This language, known as the establishment and free exercise
clauses, embodies the principles of separation of church and state and
protection of individual religious liberty.2 The Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the establishment clause has ranged from strict neutrality3 to
benevolent accommodation of governmental interference with religion.4
The Supreme Court has developed three tests to resolve disputes
which arise under the establishment clause. The first test, enunciated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman5 (the "Lemon test"), applies when a government ac-
tion or statute affords a uniform benefit or hardship to all religions, and
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment religion clauses were made applicable to
the states in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1964). See also Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984) ("The real object of the [First] Amendment was ... to
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclu-
sive patronage of the national government.") (quoting 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES 728 (1833)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962)
(purpose of establishment clause was based on belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
11 (1947) ("[I]ndividual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which
was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to
interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.").
3. For example, in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court stated that
"[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Id. at 15. See also generally
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and
religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 425 (1962) (government may not take part in composing official prayers to be recited in
public schools).
4. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the court stated that "total separation is
not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organi-
zations is inevitable." Id. at 614. See also generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792
(1983) (regulating conduct which may "harmonize" with certain religious tenets not prohib-
ited by establishment clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (fire and police
protection received by religious organizations are incidental benefits which are accorded all
persons or institutions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (lending secular text-
books to children in nonsecular schools not a violation of establishment clause).
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The "Lemon test" vas derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman; how-
ever, the Court developed this test over several years, culminating in the Lemon three-part test.
See infra notes 7-10.
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not to laws which discriminate among religions.' Under this test, a court
reviews whether (1) the statute or government action has a legitimate
legislative or secular purpose,7 (2) the principal or primary effect neither
advances nor inhibits religion' and (3) the statute or government action
fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion, 9 or produces
political divisiveness along religious lines.1"
The second test endorsed by the Supreme Court, the "strict scru-
tiny" test,11 applies to government actions or statutes which grant de-
nominational preferences or which discriminate among religions.
1 2
Under this test, any such action or statute will be invalidated unless it
(1) is justified by a compelling governmental interest13 and (2) is closely
tailored to further that interest. 4
The third test applies an historical analysis to determine the validity
of the government action or statute. For example, in Marsh v. Chain-
6. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
7. The "secular legislative purpose" element developed from McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961). In upholding Maryland Sunday closing laws, the McGowan Court stated that
"[t]he present purpose and effect of most of [the laws] is to provide a uniform day of rest for all
citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the dominant
Christian sects, does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals." Id. at 445.
8. The "primary effect" element developed from School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963). The Schempp Court stated the requirement as follows: "what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." Id. at
222.
9. The "excessive government entanglement" element of the Lemon test was developed in
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz, the Court upheld tax exemptions for
churches stating that the entanglement element is one of degree-the more entangled the gov-
ernment becomes with religion, the more likely the statute or governmental action is to be
invalid. Id. at 674. The Court noted that "[e]ither course, taxation of churches or exemption,
occasions some degree of involvement with religion." Id.
10. The "political divisiveness" portion of the excessive entanglement element was added
by Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. The Lemon Court stated that "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to pro-
tect." Id.
11. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (Minnesota statute exempting only reli-
gious organizations receiving more than 50% of their contributions from members from com-
plying with certain registration and reporting requirements held violative of establishment
clause).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 247 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (university prohib-
ited religious student group from using school grounds or buildings claiming compelling inter-
est in maintaining strict separation of church and state)).
14. Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (taxing ordinance inval-
idated because "not narrowly drawn to prevent or control abuses or evils arising from [solicita-
tion, including religious solicitations]")).
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bers,1S the Court compared the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening
each session with a prayer by a chaplain paid with public funds to the
same practice of the First Congress. The Court concluded that legisla-
tive prayer was not an establishment of religion; "it is simply a tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country." 
16
The Supreme Court recently applied the Lemon test in Lynch v.
Donnelly,17 where the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, had included a
cr6eche in its annual Christmas display. The Court held that the City's
sponsorship of the display did not violate the establishment clause,
notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche.' 8
This Note discusses the Court's interpretation and application of the
Lemon test in Lynch as well as the applicability of the other establish-
ment clause tests. This Note also discusses the problems facing courts in
deciding which test to apply in a given situation, and in actually applying
these tests. 19
This Note attempts to resolve the confusion surrounding the various
establishment clause tests by categorizing the establishment clause cases
according to common issues and constitutional concerns.2" Categoriza-
15. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
16. Id. at 792. In addition to the Lemon, strict scrutiny and historical analysis tests, Jus-
tice Brennan set forth a test in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963), as an
appropriate means of determining whether rights guaranteed by the establishment clause had
been infringed. He stated that governmental actions which "(a) serve the essentially religious
activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious
purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular
means would suffice" must be struck down.
17. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
18. Id. at 1366.
19. The history of the Lynch case illustrates the ineffective and confusing use of the vari-
ous establishment clause tests by different courts. The district court in Lynch used the Lemon
test and found the City's inclusion of the cr&ehe to be a violation of the establishment clause.
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1180 (D.R.I. 1981), aft'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). Subsequent to the district court's opinion, the Supreme
Court announced in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) the strict scrutiny test for govern-
ment action which grants a denominational preference. The First "CircuiL then affirmed the
district court's decision in Lynch based on a strict scrutiny analysis. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691
F.2d 1029, 1035 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The Supreme Court reversed
Lynch based in part on the Lemon test and in part on an historical analysis. Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984). The Court did not apply strict scrutiny because it did not
view the Christmas display as discriminatory. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13.
20. This categorization would allow the courts to focus on the specific concerns of each
area in reaching their decisions. For example, the concerns in the public school cases involve
the coercive effect of peer pressure caused by religious activities in the public schools. How-
ever, in nonpublic school cases, the courts are concerned with public funds being used in reli-
gious activities and governmental interference with religion. By categorizing the establishment
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tion of cases according to the type of review they should receive is not a
novel idea. The Supreme Court has long categorized various kinds of
governmental discrimination in the equal protection area and used differ-
ent tests depending upon the type of discrimination involved.2 Catego-
rizing cases based on distinct constitutional concerns, rather than the
current practice of attempting to fit a particular case within all the estab-
lishment clause precedents, should result in more consistent decisions.
II. HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Although this Note does not attempt to provide a complete histori-
cal background of the establishment clause, it is important to review the
intent of the Framers of the first amendment in order to understand and
analyze the various establishment clause tests developed by the Supreme
Court.
A. Intent of the First Congress
The debates of the First Congress22 clearly indicate that Congress'
overriding concern in drafting the religion clauses in the Bill of Rights
was to prevent one national religion and to assure the free exercise of
religion without government interference.23 This national focus is sup-
ported by the fact that several of the state constitutions in effect at the
time had established religions.2 4
clause cases, and applying different tests in each area, the concerns of one category can be met
without affecting the concerns and precedents in another category.
21. For example, if a statute discriminates on the basis of race, the Court will use a strict
scrutiny analysis to determine constitutionality. See, eg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). If discrimination is based on illegitimacy,
the Court will use an intermediate scrutiny test. Lall v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). If based
on age, a rational basis analysis will be used. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976). See also infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text discussing equal protec-
tion further.
22. The debates of the First Congress are found in the ANNALS OF CONGRESS. They are
not verbatim transcripts, but are the shorthand notes of a reporter, Thomas Lloyd. In the
past, there was reluctance in using these records for interpretations. However, the First Fed-
eral Congress project at The George Washington University sponsored by the National
Archives, which is preparing a multivolume documentary history of the First Congress, has
found that the ANNALS give a complete and accurate description of the debates on the religion
clauses. The first of a projected seventeen volumes is entitled 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SENATE LEGISLA-
TVE JOURNAL [hereinafter referred to as "DOCUMENTARY HISTORY"].
23. M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS 10 (1978).
24. For example, the Georgia constitution of 1777, art. VI, required that "representation
... shall be of the Protestant religion." In Maryland, art. XXXV of the declaration of rights of
the constitution of 1776 required all state officers to declare "a belief in the Christian religion."
Part I, art. III of the Massachusetts constitution provided in part that people have a right to
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James Madison, who was known to have opposed any aid to reli-
gion, proposed several amendments to Congress.-5 His initial proposal
stated, in part, "nor shall any national religion be established."26 An-
other of his proposals was later amended to read "no religion shall be
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be in-
fringed."27 However, during the August 15, 1789 debate, there was con-
cem that the amendment "might be thought to have a tendency to
abolish religion altogether."28 Several speakers urged that the word "na-
tional" be added before the word "religion."29 However, others objected
to the word "national" as it implied that the Constitution created one
nation with a national government, instead of a union of states ruled by a
federal government with limited powers.30
Madison felt that the first amendment was unnecessary. He thought
that a modem republic "would breed such a multiplicity of sects as to
make establishment unlikely even without an amendment., 31 He force-
fully expedited debate on this issue, however, because he believed a Bill
of Rights was necessary to strengthen support for the new constitution.32
require the towns to provide sufficient funds for churches and for the support and maintenance
of the public Protestant school teachers.
Evidence documenting the intent of the Framers of the first amendment suggests that they
"desired to protect the 'equal, natural and unalienable right to free exercise of religion."
Gafney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy
History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 216 (1980).
25. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451, 757 (J. Gales ed. 1789). In addition to James Madison's
proposals, several states suggested their own amendments. For example, Virginia and North
Carolina proposed identical provisions:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharg-
ing it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and violence; and
therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect
or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others.
M. MALBIN, supra note 23, at 3-4 (citing THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (J. Elliot ed. 1836), vol. 3, p. 659
(Virginia) & vol. 4, p. 1244 (North Carolina) [hereinafter referred to as "THE DEBATES"].
New Hampshire suggested that "Congress shall make no law touching religion or to infringe
the rights of conscience." Id. at 4 (citing THE DEBATES, supra at vol. 1, p. 362).
26. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (J. Gales ed. 1789). Madison's initial first amendment pro-
posal stated in full: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id.
27. Id. at 757.
28. Id. The concerns expressed were those of Peter Sylvester. In addition, Benjamin
Huntington feared that the amendment would be "extremely hurtful to the cause of religion."
Id. at 758.
29. M. MALBIN, supra note 23, at 9.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id. at 5.
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As interpreted by Thomas Lloyd, the reporter for the Annals of Congress,
Madison "believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-
eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which
they would compel others to conform. He thought if the word national
was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it
was intended to prevent.
33
However, "national" was dropped from the language which the
House adopted: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to
prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience."
34
The Senate offered several substitute amendments before sending its
final version to the House stating, in part, "Congress shall make no law
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free
exercise of religion., 35 A conference committee was convened and the
final language, as we know it today, was accepted: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."
36
It seems clear from the debates of the First Congress in 1789, and
from the existence of publicly supported religious schools and state con-
stitutions which required particular religious faiths for political offices,
that the religion clauses were adopted to prevent the national govern-
ment from imposing its religious convictions on the people of the states
by establishing one national religion or by preventing the free exercise of
religion. It appears that the Supreme Court has often lost sight of this
goal in its interpretation of the religion clauses' intent and history.
B. Supreme Court's Interpretation of Intent
In many of its establishment clause cases, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Framers' intent in adopting the first amendment. This
interpretation has varied widely, from a strict no aid view,3 7 to the view
that some aid is permissible within certain carefully delineated
guidelines.38
The majority of establishment clause cases concern public and pri-
33. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758-59 (. Gales ed. 1789).
34. Id. at 796.
35. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 22, at 166.
36. Id. at 186.
37. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Edue. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (Court held unconstitutional statutes providing financial aid for attendance at nonpub-
lic schools). See also infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
38. See, eg., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (per curiam) (holding constitutional
portions of Ohio statute providing nonpublic schools with books, standardized testing and
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vate schools. The Court has strongly opposed any form of religious influ-
ence in the public schools.3 9 It has, however, allowed certain forms of
governmental aid to private schools.4 While the public school cases ap-
pear to be fairly straightforward as to their strict requirements, the Court
has struggled with governmental aid to nonpublic schools. For example,
in 1947 the Court interpreted the establishment clause as requiring that
"[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions . . . [which] teach or practice reli-
gion. ' 41 Yet, in the same case, the Court went on to hold that fares paid
for the public transportation of children attending religious schools could
be reimbursed from public funds and did not violate the establishment
clause.42
In 1974 in Meek v. Pittenger,43 the Court invalidated a state statute
which required public school teachers to provide auxiliary services, such
as remedial reading, to religious schools." The teachers were not em-
ployed by the religious schools nor directly subject to discipline by a reli-
gious authority. However, the Court found that there was a "potential"
danger that these teachers might somehow intertwine religious doctrine
with secular instruction. 45 This possibility was enough to find that the
statute violated the establishment clause. This strict interpretation of the
establishment clause does not appear to follow the original intent of the
Framers since this action would not establish a national religion nor
would it interfere with the free exercise of religion.
In interpreting the establishment clause, the Court has often stated
that there is a conflict between the religion clauses. Chief Justice Burger
stated in Walz v. Tax Commission' that "[t]he Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are
cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical ex-
scoring, diagnostic services and remedial services, but unconstitutional portions relating to
field trip services, instructional materials and equipment).
39. See generally, School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading and recita-
tion of Lord's Prayer in public schools held unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (recitation of denominationally neutral morning prayer in public schools held
unconstitutional).
40. See generally, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (lending secular textbooks
to children in nonsecular schools held constitutional); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (reimbursement of fees for public transportation of children to nonpublic schools held
constitutional).
41. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
42. Id. at 17-18.
43. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
44. Id. at 373.
45. Id. at 370-71.
46. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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treme, would tend to clash with the other. ' 47
The Court is especially aware of this apparent conflict in the non-
public school area. According to the Court, the establishment clause
prevents any aid to religious schools which could possibly be used to
"advance" religion.48 Such aid would tend to establish a religion. At the
same time, aid given to the purely secular aspects of a religious school
cannot involve the government to the point where government "inhibits"
the free exercise of religion at those schools.4 9
This conflict between the clauses seems to have developed due to the
Court's expansive interpretation of the establishment clause as prevent-
ing conduct which "establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.' ' 5° However, in reviewing the intent of the Framers, there does not
appear to be a conflict because they had only one goal in mind-prevent-
ing government interference with individual religious freedom.51
Because the Court has taken the position that the establishment and
free exercise clauses have two separate conflicting goals, the Court's deci-
sions often have been inconsistent.52
In Thomas v. Review Board,3 a Jehovah's Witness quit his job when
he was transferred to weapons production, a job which was contrary to
his religious beliefs. The State of Indiana denied unemployment benefits
47. Id. at 668-69. In School District v. Schempp, Justice Goldberg articulated the rela-
tionship between the establishment and free exercise clauses: "The fullest realization of true
religious liberty requires that government... effect no favoritism among sects... and that it
work deterrence of no religious belief." 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
48. See, eg., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (auxiliary teachers in religious
schools cannot remain religiously neutral; therefore, aid is impermissible); and Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971) (teachers of secular subjects unable to completely
distinguish between secular teaching and religious doctrine; therefore, aid is impermissible).
49. See, eg., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (cannot ignore the danger that governmental power
will intrude on religion and conflict with free exercise clause).
50. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1361 (1984) (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (empha-
sis added)).
51. "The [free exercise and establishment] clauses should be read as stating a single pre-
cept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these
clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to
confer a benefit or to impose a burden." P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962).
52. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (supplemental payments to teach-
ers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools is unconstitutional) with Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (lending secular textbooks to children in nonsecular schools is constitu-
tional). Compare also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (tuition reimbursement to poor parents of children in nonsecular schools violates estab-
lishment clause) with Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursement to parents
for fares paid for the public transportation of their children to nonsecular schools is not
violative).
53. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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because he did not leave his job for good cause. 4 The Court found that
such denial violated the free exercise clause.5 5 Justice Rehnquist, in dis-
sent, argued that if Indiana's statute permitted unemployment benefits to
persons who quit their jobs due to religious reasons, the statute would
violate the establishment clause because it would have a religious pur-
pose, advance religion and entangle the state in determining good faith
religious beliefs. 6
Justice Rehnquist suggested that there need not be this conflict be-
tween the two religion clauses. He stated that Justice Stewart discussed
the correct approach in his dissent in School District v. Schempp. The
establishment clause should be limited to "'government support of
proselytizing activities of religious sects by throwing the weight of secu-
lar authorit[ies] behind the dissemination of religious tenets.' ,58 Justice
Rehnquist also suggested that "[g]overnmental assistance which does not
have the effect of 'inducing' religious belief, but instead merely 'accom-
modates' or implements an independent religious choice does not imper-
missibly involve the government in religious choices and therefore does
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1
5 9
In attempting to explain the sometimes inconsistent positions of the
Court, Chief Justice Burger stated in Walz v. Tax Commission:' "The
considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives
from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on as-
pects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases
but have limited meaning as general principles."'"
In its effort to set guidelines for establishment clause cases, the
Court has developed the three tests previously discussed-the Lemon
test, strict scrutiny and historical analysis. However, application of these
tests has not proven consistent. In fact, it seems to have added more
confusion than clarity. This confusion is manifest in the recent case of
Lynch v. Donnelly.62
54. Id. at 712.
55. Id. at 720.
56. Id. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
58. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 314 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
59. Id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
61. Id. at 668.
62. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
The City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erects a Christmas
display as part of its observance of the winter holiday season. The dis-
play is situated in a privately owned park located in the heart of the
City's shopping district. The display includes several Christmas objects
such as Santa Claus and reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh.63 For at least
forty years a life-sized creche has been a part of this display, 64 "posi-
tioned... in a central and highly visible location. ' 61 It costs the City
approximately twenty dollars each year to erect and dismantle the
creche. In addition, expenses incurred by the City in lighting the creche
are nominal. The City has not spent any money on the maintenance of
the creche for the past ten years.66
Pawtucket residents, individual members of the Rhode Island affili-
ate of the American Civil Liberties Union and the affiliate itself brought
an action in the United States District Court for Rhode Island challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the City's inclusion of the creche in the an-
nual display.67 The District Court for Rhode Island held that the City's
inclusion of the cr6che in the display violated the establishment clause. 68
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.69 In a five to four
decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 0
B. The District Court Opinion
The City of Pawtucket based its initial defense of the creche on three
main arguments. It claimed that "the emergence of a secular dimension
to Christmas ha[d] rendered the holiday's meaning merely vestigial,"'"
the inclusion of the creche in the display was not primarily religious be-
cause the cr6che had become "secularized," 7 2 and that even if Christmas
63. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984). The display also included "candy-
striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner [which
read] 'SEASONS GREETINGS'." Id.
64. Id. The present cr6che was purchased in 1973 at a cost to the City of $1365. The
cr6che is presently valued at approximately $200. Id.
65. Id. at 1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1358.
67. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981).
68. Id. at 1181.
69. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1035 (1st Cir. 1982).
70. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
71. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1163.
72. Id. at 1165.
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and the creche are not secular, the creche, when viewed in the totality of
the display, did not violate the establishment clause. 3
The district court disagreed with each of the City's contentions. As
to Christmas becoming a secular holiday, the court stated that Christmas
"has not lost its religious significance; rather, it has gained a secular sig-
nificance."'74 The court found that the mere fact that the Christmas holi-
day had an important secular element did not justify government
involvement in that holiday. 5
The district court also disagreed with the City's claim that the
creche had lost its religious meaning and had become secularized. The
court stated that because the creche is the representation of the birth of
Christ, it is immediately connected to the religious aspect of Christmas. 6
As a symbol, the creche is the "embodiment of the Christian view of the
birth and nature of Christ. ' 7  The court addressed the "totality of the
display" argument when it reviewed the secular purpose of including the
cr6che in the display.78
The court then discussed whether the City violated the establish-
ment clause by involving itself in the religious activity. The court noted
that "[g]overnment may involve itself in activities with a religious con-
tent as long as it does so carefully, in ways that avoid the harm that the
Establishment Clause was intended to forestall."' 79  Using the Lemon
test,80 the district court undertook the following analysis.
73. Id. at 1168-69. The City argued that, when applying the Lemon test, the court must
not focus on the religious element itself but rather on the activity of which the City is a part.
Thus, the City maintained that the court should focus on the commercial activity of erecting
and maintaining the display, not on the creche. The district court disagreed. It stated that
"[w]henever the government employs a religious object ... , the Establishment Clause de-
mands that it account for its reasons in stepping beyond the secular sphere to accomplish its
goals." Id. at 1169.
74. Id. at 1163.
75. Id. at 1164. The court noted, for example, that while the Bible is undisputedly an
instrument of religion, "the Bible [also] possesses an independent literary and anthropological
value that makes it a permissible object of study in the public schools in the course of a curric-
ulum designed to emphasize those elements." Id.
76. Id. at 1167.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1168-74.
79. Id. at 1168.
80. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). It is important to note
that at the time the district court reached its decision (November 10, 1981), the Supreme
Court had not yet decided Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (decided April 21, 1982). In
Larson, the Court held that strict scrutiny should be applied in cases where a statute or gov-
ernmental action grants a denominational preference. Larson, 456 U.S. at 255. The action in
Lynch probably would have fallen into this category since the City was giving Christianity a
denominational preference. But see supra note 19 and accompanying text discussing the con-
fusion over which test to apply. See also infra text accompanying notes 100-03 discussing the
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1. Secular purpose
Under the purpose element of Lemon, "[t]he government action
must 'reflect a clearly secular... purpose.' "81 The district court stated
that any secular purpose offered by a governmental entity must be closely
scrutinized.s" The City claimed that the creche must be viewed in the
totality of the display and that the purpose for inclusion of the crehe
was similar to the purpose for the display as a whole: economic and
cultural or traditional.83 The court disagreed and found that, while the
purpose of the Christmas display was to bring shoppers into the down-
town area and the display was characteristic of the way Americans cele-
brate Christmas, the creche only represented the way "Christians
celebrate Christmas."84 The court thus concluded that the creche was
included in the display "in order to express the City's approval and en-
dorsement of the religious message that the symbol conveys.
'
)
8 5
use of strict scrutiny by the court of appeals in Lynch, and see infra notes 188-93 and accompa-
nying text discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of strict scrutiny in Lynch.
81. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1168 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973)).
82. Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961)).
83. Id. at 1170.
84. Id. at 1171 (emphasis in original). The court noted that it was aware of at least two
courts which had accepted an intent to "show how the American people celebrate the holiday
season surrounding Christmas" as a valid secular purpose for the inclusion of the creche in a
public Christmas display. Id. at 1170 (citing Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City & County of Denver, 508
F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Colo. 1981), opinion incorporated in 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981)).
The court found the rationale in those cases "extremely troubling." Id.
85. Id. at 1174. The court stated that there was a fine line between "acknowledgment"
and "promotion" of religious practices by government. Id. at 1171. While the Supreme Court
has made it clear that the establishment clause does not require "government to ignore the
existence of religion in American life, it is equally clear that there are limits on the ability of
government affirmatively to employ religious practices and objects to acknowledge religion's
role." Id.
The court stated that the statements and actions of the City and the Mayor supported a
reasonable inference of City approval of Christianity. Id. at 1172. First, the City had never
attempted to disclaim any endorsement of the religious message that the cr6eche conveyed. Id.
Second, the court found that the only religious heritage and traditions that have been a
part of the City's displays and official ceremonies have been those of the Christian majority of
its citizenry. Id.
Finally, the court interpreted the City's argument-that removing the religious elements
from Christmas would achieve the very hostility toward religion that the establishment clause
was created to prevent-to mean that the City's reason for including the cr6che was for reli-
gious purposes only. Id. at 1172-73.
In contrast to Pawtucket's failure to disclaim any endorsement of the cr6eche's religious
significance, in Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam), the government
disavowed any affiliation with the religious content of a creche located at the Pageant of Peace
in Washington, D.C. Three plaques were located within the federal parkland and contained a
history of the Pageant. The plaques stated, in part:
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2. Primary effect
In order for governmental action to pass the primary effect element
of the Lemon test, the district court stated that the action must not have
a "'direct and immediate effect of advancing religion,'" even though it
may effectively promote legitimate secular ends. 6 The court found that
the City's inclusion of the cr6che gave an "aura of governmental ap-
proval" which was "a subsidy as real and as valuable as financial
assistance." 7
3. Entanglement
The district court next analyzed the two parts of the entanglement
test: (1) administrative entanglement, which is implicated when the ac-
tion brings government officials into close, ongoing contact with the af-
fairs of religious institutions, 8 and (2) potential for political divisiveness,
which assesses the probability that the government involvement "will en-
courage division of the polity along religious lines."8 9
The court did not find administrative entanglement because there
was no interaction between the City and any of the community's reli-
gious organizations. 0 However, the court did find that the cr6che failed
the political divisiveness portion of the entanglement test.9' The City
argued that the cr6che had been a part of its display for forty years and
the practice had not evoked any apparent dissension.92 The court found,
The National Park Service sponsors the Pageant on the basis that this National Cele-
bration Event is wholly secular in character, purpose, and main effect. The illumi-
nated cr6che display is intended to be reverential to the religious heritage aspect of
Christmas; but that display is not meant, and should not be taken, either to promote
religious worship, or profane the symbols of any religion[.]
Id. at 73-74. The Allen court found that the plaques lessened the impact of governmental
involvement in the criehe display. Id. at 73.
86. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1174 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85 n.39 (1973)). As the district court noted, the Supreme Court
has stated that the establishment clause reaches "not only the actual establishment of religion,
but also the 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity."' Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772 (emphasis in original)).
87. Id. at 1178. The City claimed that a violative effect had not occurred. Id. at 1175-76.
The court disagreed, finding that people knew the display was sponsored in part by the City,
that the life-sized cr6eche was not insignificant, and that the religious message of the cr~ehe was
not muted by the overall display. Id. at 1176-78.
88. Id. at 1178-79 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-20 (1971); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975)).
89. Id. at 1179 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 796 (1973)).
90. Id. Evidence showed that the City purchased the components and designed the layout
of the display without any assistance or input from the City's religious organizations. Id.
91. Id. at 1180.
92. Id. at 1179.
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however, that while there was once an appearance of harmony among
the townspeople, once the City's practice was challenged by the lawsuit,
"the atmosphere has been a horrifying one of anger, hostility, name call-
ing and political maneuvering.
'93
The district court found that, based on the Lemon test, the City's
inclusion of the creche in its annual Christmas display was a violation of
the establishment clause.94 It therefore ordered that the City be perma-
nently enjoined from continuing the practice.
95
C. The Court of Appeals Opinion
The issues raised on appeal included whether the district court erred
in finding that the plaintiffs had standing96 and whether the inclusion of
the cr6che in the Christmas display constituted a violation of the estab-
lishment clause.97
Finding that the plaintiffs had standing as municipal taxpayers to
challenge the City's ownership and display of the creche,98 the court next
addressed the district court's finding of an establishment clause violation.
The court of appeals reviewed the district court's analysis under the
Lemon test;99 however, it concluded that the Lemon test was not the
appropriate test to be applied in Lynch because inclusion of the creche
demonstrated the City's preference for Christianity over other reli-
gions.1°° The court noted that the Supreme Court had recently decided,
93. Id. at 1180.
94. Id. at 1181.
95. Id.
96. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1030 (1st Cir. 1982). The City argued that the
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), severely limited federal and state
taxpayer standing, leaving no room for municipal taxpayer status. Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1030.
In Valley Forge, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare transferred surplus
real property to a church-related college pursuant to a federal statute. The Supreme Court
found that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue, even though their action was based on
the establishment clause. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489. In prior decisions which held taxpay-
ers had standing, the plaintiffs were challenging the exercise of congressional power under the
taxing and spending clause. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Unlike Flast, the statute
at issue in Valley Forge was enacted by Congress under the property clause of the Constitution.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480.
The court of appeals in Lynch disagreed with Pawtucket's assertion and concluded that
Valley Forge did not alter the long-established rule of municipal taxpayer standing. Lynch, 691
F.2d at 1032.
97. Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1032.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1032-34.
100. Id. at 1034.
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in Larson v. Valente,' that a strict scrutiny test is appropriate when
government action grants a denominational preference.10 2 The strict
scrutiny test requires invalidation of government action unless the action
"is justified by a compelling governmental interest" and "is closely fitted
to further that interest." ' 3
The First Circuit found that the City presented no compelling gov-
ernmental interest in owning and displaying the creche. 1' Because the
City was unable to advance any legitimate secular purpose at trial for
inclusion of the cr6che, the City could not state a compelling purpose.1 0 5
The court of appeals concluded that since the first element of the strict
scrutiny test was not met, it was unnecessary to address the second ele-
ment.10 6 The court then affirmed the district court's decision.
10 7
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. The Majority
The majority'08 began their analysis with an historical review of the
purpose and intent of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the
first amendment. The Court stated that while it has recognized that the
first amendment was designed "'to prevent, as far as possible, the intru-
sion of either [the church or the state] into the precincts of the
other,' "109 it has also recognized that "'total separation is not possi-
101. 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (challenge to state statute which denied exemption from certain
registration and reporting requirements to religious organizations receiving more than half of
their total contributions from nonmembers).
102. Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1034. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14 discussing the
strict scrutiny test.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1035.
105. By displaying the creche, the City "tried to endorse and promulgate religious beliefs."
Id. at 1034-35 (citing Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1173 (D.R.I. 1981)).
106. Id. at 1035.
107. Id. Judge Bownes concurred in the opinion but wrote separately to rebut the dissent's
assertion that Christmas originated as a religious holiday. He reviewed the historical evidence
of Christmas and concluded that Christmas has roots which "extend to folk customs and
pagan rites that predate the birth of Christ." He noted, however, that the crche was tied
firmly to the Christian religion and this is the distinction between the creche and Christmas as
a holiday. Id. at 1037 (Bownes, J., concurring).
Judge Campbell dissented, finding the City's display to be "nothing more nor less than a
potpourri of well-recognized Christmas symbols." He argued that to retain the holiday but
outlaw ancient symbols "seems to me an empty and even rather boorish gesture." Id. at 1037-
38 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
108. The Court was split five to four. The opinion of the majority was delivered by Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell and O'Connor.
109. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1358 (1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
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ble.' ,110 The Court explained that "[n]o significant segment of our soci-
ety.., can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the
other parts, much less from government." ' Due to the seemingly con-
flicting objectives of the establishment and free exercise clauses, the ma-
jority felt that the Constitution does not require complete separation but
mandates accommodation. "12
The Court noted that accommodation of religion could be found in
the first session of the First Congress in 1789. The Court concluded that
since the First Congress considered appointments and compensation for
chaplains serving during legislative sessions the same week that the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses were approved, the Framers did not
perceive any conflicts between the religion clauses." 3 In addition, the
Court noted that the decisions of the First Congress should be given
great deference when interpreting the Constitution."1 '
The Court then discussed the "unbroken history of official acknowl-
edgment by... government of the role of religion in American life from
at least 1789." 1' 5 For example, Thanksgiving' 16 and Christmas1 7 were
proclaimed national holidays and federal employees enjoy the holidays
off, paid from public revenues. 8 In addition, the national motto is "In
God we trust.""' 9
The Court said that it has refused to use an "absolutist" approach to
establishment clause questions, invalidating any government action that
confers benefits to religion. 2 Instead, the Court stated that its role was
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1359.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926)).
115. Id. at 1360.
116. The Court noted that "[t]he day after the first amendment was proposed, Congress
urged President Washington to proclaim 'a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be ob-
served by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many and signal favours of Almighty
God."' Id. at 1360 n.2 (citing A. STOKES & L. PnEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNrITED STATES 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964)).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982).
118. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360.
119. 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1982). In addition, United States coins have the inscription "In God
We Trust." 31 U.S.C. § 112(d)(1) (1982). The Court noted other examples of acknowledg-
ment, including: the language "under God" added to our Pledge of Allegiance in 1954; reli-
gious paintings displayed in public art galleries, the Capitol and the Supreme Court; and the
presence of chapels in the Capitol. Also, Presidential proclamations to commemorate the Na-
tional Day of Prayer, 36 U.S.C. § 169h (1982), Jewish Heritage Week, and the Jewish High
Holy Days have been issued. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
120. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361. An absolutist approach would require "mechanically invali-
dating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to
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to scrutinize official action to determine whether it establishes a religion
or tends to do so.121 The Court stated that each case requires "line draw-
ing" and that a fixed per se rule could not be framed.
1 22
In analyzing establishment clause cases, the Court emphasized its
unwillingness to use only one test or criterion.1 23  However, the Court
did acknowledge that it is often useful to apply the Lemon test, inquiring
whether there is a secular purpose, whether the primary effect is to ad-
vance or inhibit religion, and whether there is an excessive entanglement
of government with religion.124
1. Secular purpose
In applying the Lemon test to Lynch, the Court initially noted that
the focus of the inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the
Christmas season.1 25 The Court found that the district court had erred
by focusing almost exclusively on the cr6che independent from the dis-
play, and by inferring from the religious nature of the creche that the
City had no secular purpose for the display.26
The Court found that in the context of the Christmas season, the
inclusion of the creche was not "a purposeful or surreptitious effort to
express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular reli-
gious message."1 27 The City's inclusion of the creche in the display was
to celebrate the holiday and to illustrate the origins of the holiday.
128
The Court deemed these to be "legitimate secular purposes."
129
2. Primary effect
The Court's inquiry as to whether the primary effect of including
the creche conferred a substantial and impermissible benefit on religion
focused on comparisons with prior cases where the beneficial effect did
religion in general or to one faith." Id. The Court dismissed this approach as being "simplis-
tic." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1362. Cf id. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1362. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text discussing the Lemon test.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1362-63.
127. Id. at 1363.
128. Id. (citing Allen v. Hieckel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Concerned for
Separation of Church & State v. City & County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981),
opinion incorporating 508 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981)).
129. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that the criche had a secular purpose,
"which is all that Lemon requires." The test did not require that the government's objective be
"exclusively secular." Id. at 1363 n.6.
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not violate the establishment clause. The Court noted that such compar-
isons were difficult to make; nonetheless, it made several comparisons.
For example, the Court compared the beneficial effect of the creche on
religion with the beneficial effect that tax exemptions for church proper-
ties had on religion. 30 The Court found no greater aid to religion deriv-
ing from inclusion of the cr6che than from "benefits and endorsements
previously held not violative of the Establishment Clause."'
13 1
The Court observed that even if the inclusion of the creche some-
what advanced religion, some legitimate advancement of religion may
result from government action. "'Not every law that confers an "indi-
rect," "remote" or "incidental" benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason
alone, constitutionally invalid.' " The Court concluded that any bene-
fit accruing to religion from the Pawtucket cr6ehe was indirect, remote
and incidental and not a violation of the establishment clause.
133
3. Entanglement
The Court agreed with the district court's finding that administra-
tive entanglement did not exist because there was no evidence of contact
between the City and church authorities concerning the content or de-
sign of the creche. 134
As to the political divisiveness portion of the entanglement test,
however, the Court found that inquiry was not required. It stated that
the political divisiveness inquiry was called for only in cases which in-
volve a direct subsidy to church sponsored schools or other religious in-
stitutions.1 35 The Court stated that the district court had erred in finding
that political divisiveness based on dissension in the town caused by the
filing of the lawsuit signaled entanglement. 36 The Court commented
that a litigant could not "create the appearance of divisiveness [by com-
130. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). In addition, the Court com-
pared the beneficial effect of including the cr~ehe in the display with the beneficial effect of
expenditures for transportation of students attending church sponsored schools (Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)), Sunday closing laws (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961)) and legislative prayers (Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
131. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364. The Court distinguished Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116 (1982). In Larkin, a state statute substantially aided religion by giving religious insti-
tutions veto power in regard to liquor licenses. The Supreme Court held that the statute vio-
lated the establishment clause. In Lynch, however, there was "no comparable benefit to
religion." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
132. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) (bracketed portion provided by Lynch Court)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1364-65 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.ll (1983)).
136. Id. at 1365.
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mencing a lawsuit] and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement." '137
The Court concluded that the City had a secular purpose for includ-
ing the creche, that it had not impermissibly advanced religion, and that
it did not create excessive entanglement between government and
religion.
138
Having satisfied the Lemon test, the Court further discussed the
cr~ehe's role in history and in the celebration of Christmas. It stated that
the creche, "like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a reminder of the
origins of Christmas." '39 However, "[t]o forbid the use of this one pas-
sive symbol•., at the very time people are taking note of the season with
Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other public places,
... would be a stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and to our
holdings. ' ' "4
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in order to suggest a
clarification of the meaning of the establishment clause. She contended
that the establishment clause prohibits excessive entanglement with reli-
gious institutions and, more importantly, government endorsement or
disapproval of religion.141 In addition, since the Court had never relied
on political divisiveness as an independent ground for holding a govern-
ment practice unconstitutional, the political divisiveness issue should not
be an independent test of constitutionality.142
Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, the purpose element of the
Lemon test asks whether the government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion.143 She stated that the proper inquiry was
whether the government intended to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion by its action. Justice O'Connor found that the
City did not intend to endorse nor disapprove of any religions. She felt
that the City's purpose for including the cr6che in the display was to
celebrate the public holiday through its traditional symbols and, thus,
this purpose was not violative of the establishment clause."
The "effect" element of the Lemon test, according to Justice
O'Connor, asks whether, irrespective of the actual purpose, the practice
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. Even if a practice had
in fact caused advancement or inhibition of religion, such a practice
would not be invalidated unless it conveyed a message of endorsement or
disapproval. 145 Justice O'Connor found that Pawtucket's display of the
crehe did not communicate a message that the government endorsed the
Christian religions represented by the creche. She believed that the
creche was a traditional symbol of the holiday and recognition of that
holiday was not understood to be an endorsement of religion.' 46 There-
fore, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's opinion that the City's
inclusion of the creche in its Christmas display was not a violation of the
establishment clause.' 47
C. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Brennan's dissent
Justice Brennan stated that the majority reached "an essentially nar-
row result which turn[ed] largely upon the particular holiday context in
which the City of Pawtucket's nativity scene appeared."' 48 He found
that this result implicitly left open several questions. These were, for
example, whether the public display on public property of a creche stand-
ing alone would be constitutional,' 4 9 whether the public display or other
religious symbols such as a cross would also be permissible 5 ' or whether
the Pawtucket cr6che without the display of Santa Claus and the other
secular objects would have been valid.'
In addition, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority that the
Lemon test is "simply one path that may be followed or not at the
Court's option."' 52 In his view, the Lemon test is mandatory' 5 3 and the
Court has consistently held that the government action in question must
accord with the three elements of the Lemon test in order to pass muster
145. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 1369 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 1370 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1370 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
149. Id. at 1370 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d
Cir. 1984), af'd mem per curiam, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (Village of Scarsdale cannot prohibit
erection of a privately owned cr6eche in public park based on establishment clause).
150. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 159 discussing
City of Los Angeles' erection of illuminated cross in front of City Hall.
151. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. "Indeed, ever since its initial formulation, the Lemon test has been consistently
looked upon as the fundamental tool of Establishment Clause analysis." Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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under the establishment clause.1 54
Applying the Lemon test to the City's inclusion of the cr6che in its
Christmas display, Justice Brennan found a clear violation. 155 He argued
that, because there was no explicit statement of purpose 156 and because
Pawtucket's objectives could be readily accomplished by other means,15 7
inclusion of the cr6ehe could be inferred to have a sectarian, rather than
secular purpose.
1 58
Regarding the second element of the test, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that using the creche in the display had the effect of benefiting one
religion. In addition, he stated that inclusion of the cr6che conveyed a
message to minority religious groups, as well as to nonreligious groups,
that their views were not "similarly worthy of public recognition nor en-
titled to public support." 
159
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
no administrative entanglement existed. 6" He noted that after the Lynch
decision, the City could expect Jews or other non-Christian groups to
154. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that even though the Court ini-
tially used a strict scrutiny test in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), it used the Lemon
test as well. Brennan emphatically noted that only in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(legislative prayer upheld), did the Court use neither strict scrutiny nor the Lemon analysis.
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1375 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. The City claimed that its purpose in erecting the display was to celebrate the holiday
and promote both retail sales and goodwill. Id. at 1372-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1372 & n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The City claimed its purpose for including
the cr6eche was exclusively secular. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1170. See supra text accompanying
note 83 discussing the City's purpose for inclusion of the crbehe in the display. Therefore, it
may be inferred that the purpose of including the cr6che was to celebrate the holiday and
promote sales and goodwill. However, Justice Brennan argued these purposes could have been
accomplished just as easily by using the rest of the display without the cr&he. Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1372-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982), the Court struck
down a Massachusetts statute which gave church governing bodies the power to veto applica-
tions for liquor licenses because the government could accomplish its secular objectives by
other means.
158. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1372-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan noted that
the California Supreme Court had expressed the following view when it considered a similar
issue in regard to the erection of an illuminated cross in front of the Los Angeles City Hall:
When a city so openly promotes the religious meaning of one religion's holidays,
the benefit reaped by that religion and the disadvantage suffered by other religions is
obvious. Those persons who do not share those holidays are relegated to the status of
outsiders by their own government; those persons who do observe those holidays can
take pleasure in seeing the symbol of their belief given official sanction and special
status.
Id. at 1373 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792,
803, 587 P.2d 663, 670, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 874 (1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring)).
160. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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press for inclusion of their symbols."' In addition, even though there
was no apparent political divisiveness in the community prior to the law-
suit, the City divided along religious lines after the suit was filed. Justice
Brennan maintained that the district court observed correctly that the
"quiescence [before the suit] of those opposed to the creche may have
reflected nothing more than their sense of futility in opposing the major-
ity."' 6 2 Justice Brennan easily concluded that Pawtucket's inclusion of
the creche was unconstitutional.1
63
Justice Brennan then attacked the majority's two main arguments
for constitutionality under the Lemon test. First, Justice Brennan argued
that the majority improperly focused on the creche in the holiday con-
text. 16 He maintained that the creche has inherent religious significance
and that the majority was incorrect in labeling it as no more than a
"traditional" symbol of the holiday. 165 Justice Brennan stated that the
creche was the "chief symbol of the characteristically Christian belief"
and, when publicly sponsored by the government, it is a dramatic re-
minder to those who do not share those same beliefs, of their differences
with the Christian faith.
1 66
Second, Justice Brennan argued that the majority failed to see both
the secular and sectarian aspects of Christmas. He found a serious flaw
in the conclusion that once the designation of Christmas as a public holi-
day was held constitutionally acceptable, "virtually every form of gov-
161. Justice Brennan based this assertion on the fact that the Mayor of Pawtucket, in his
testimony, remarked that he would include a Menorah in future displays. Id. at 1374 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 796 (1973)) ("competing efforts [by religious groups] to gain or maintain the support of
government" has "occasioned considerable civil strife").
162. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F.
Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.R.I. 1981)).
163. Id. at 1375 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1375-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that in Hunt v. Mc-
Nair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973), the Court noted that "[a]id normally may be thought to have a
primary effect of advancing religion when it ... [supports] a specifically religious activity in an
otherwise substantially secular setting." In addition, the secular setting of a public school does
not make the practice of school prayer constitutional. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
and School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
165. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also noted that the City did
nothing to disclaim government approval of the religious significance of the creche. Id. at
1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that such a disclaimer may be a
factor in deciding whether a religious display is objectionable. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting),
See, e.g., Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (inclusion of
crinhe in Pageant of Peace on federal parkland adjacent to White House conditioned on erec-
tion of explanatory plaques disclaiming any government sponsorship of religious beliefs associ-
ated with the criche).
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ernmental association with the celebration of the holiday" would also be
acceptable.1 67 He argued that the establishment clause allows govern-
ment to participate in the secular celebration of Christmas but not in the
religious or sectarian aspects of Christmas.
168
Justice Brennan also took issue with the majority's list of "official
acknowledgments" of the role of religion in this country. He noted that
while some acknowledgments such as Thanksgiving derived from reli-
gious motivations, they have now become secular celebrations or ac-
knowledgments.1 69  Additionally, he remarked that certain practices,
such as the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, are a form of
"ceremonial deism," and are not violative of the establishment clause
"because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content." 170  In addition, he stated that such practices were "probably
necessary to serve certain secular functions"; however, the creche is not
necessary to accommodate the secular celebration of Christmas.
171
The majority's historical analysis also concerned Justice Brennan
because it failed to focus on the central issue of "whether the challenged
practices 'threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply
feared.' "172 In the past, the Court had consistently focused historical
inquiry on the particular practice under review. For example, in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland,173 the Court focused its historical inquiry of Sunday
closing laws from the Colonial period through the present.1 74 In con-
trast, the Lynch majority did not discuss the history of public celebration
of Christmas or the use of publicly displayed nativity scenes. Justice
Brennan concluded the reason for this was because history does not show
such similar approval of the public celebration of Christmas.
17 1
167. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1378 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 85 for the district
court's discussion of this point.
168. Id. at 1377-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Another example of a governmental practice
which derived from religious motivation is found in the Sunday closing laws which were up-
held in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (fact that a government practice coincides
to some extent with certain religious beliefs does not render it unconstitutional).
170. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that these
practices serve the wholly secular purpose of "inspiring commitment to meet some national
challenge" or to solemnize public occasions. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1383 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
173. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
174. Id. at 431-40.
175. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1383-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reviewed the
history of Christmas in the United States and found that the development of Christmas as a
public holiday is a comparatively recent phenomenon. He stated that "It]he historical record,
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In conclusion, Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he City's action should be recognized for what it is: a coer-
cive, though perhaps small, step toward establishing the sectar-
ian preferences of the majority at the expense of the minority,
accomplished by placing public facilities and funds in support
of the religious symbolism and theological tidings that the
cr6che conveys. 176
2. Justice Blackmun's dissent
Justice Blackmun argued that not only did the majority's decision
make light of the Court's precedents, but the majority "ironically...
does an injustice to the cr6che and the message it manifests.' 177 He
stated that the majority has removed the sacred message of the crehe
and relegated it to a neutral symbol of the Christmas holiday season. 78
V. ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN LYNCH
Lynch v. Donnelly179 epitomizes the confusion surrounding the
proper test for establishment clause analysis. The district court found a
violation of the establishment clause based on the Lemon test, 80 the
court of appeals affirmed based on the strict scrutiny test, 81 and the
Supreme Court reversed based in part on the Lemon test and in part on
an historical analysis theory.182
The Supreme Court discussed the Lemon test as being "useful" but
not required in establishment clause cases.' 83 However, as Justice Bren-
contrary to the Court's uninformed assumption, suggests that at the very least conflicting
views toward the celebration of Christmas were an important element of [religious] competi-
tion at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." Id. at 1385 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
addition, Justice Brennan stated that "there is no evidence whatsoever that the Framers would
have expressly approved a Federal celebration of the Christmas holiday including public dis-
plays of a nativity scene." Id. at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1387 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun was joined by Justice Stevens.
178. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
180. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1181 (D.R.I. 1981). See supra notes 71-95 and
accompanying text for discussion of the district court opinion.
181. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1034-35 (1st Cir. 1982). See supra notes 96-107
and accompanying text for discussion of the court of appeals opinion.
182. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360-65. Compare also Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1181 (creche spon-
sored by city violative) with Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City &
County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (D. Colo. 1981), opinion incorporating 508 F.
Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981) (cr&he sponsored by city not violative).
183. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
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nan pointed out, the Lemon test, until very recently, had been considered
mandatory."8 4 The Lynch Court stated that the Lemon test was not "rel-
evant" in Marsh v. Chambers;"5 however, it did not discuss why the test
was irrelevant. Marsh was the first establishment clause case in which
the Court did not even attempt to discuss the Lemon test. In Marsh, it
was alleged that the Nebraska legislature violated the establishment
clause by beginning their sessions with a prayer conducted by a paid
chaplain; however, the Court found no violation.'8 6 As Justice Brennan
stated in his Lynch dissent, perhaps Marsh is "only a single, aberrant
departure from our settled method of analyzing Establishment Clause
cases" and it may be limited strictly to its facts.' 7
The Court also noted that the Lemon test was not useful in Larson v.
Valente.' In Larson, the Court held that a Minnesota reporting statute
violated the establishment clause by requiring reporting by certain reli-
gious organizations, thereby discriminating among religions. 18 9  How-
ever, the Larson Court used a new approach-the strict scrutiny test.' 90
The Court in Larson announced that the Lemon test is "intended to
apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to pro-
visions.., that discriminate among religions."' 9 ' Denominational pref-
erence requires application of the strict scrutiny test. If this is the rule,
the City of Pawtucket's inclusion of the creche in its display would not be
a government action which affords a uniform benefit to all religions, since
the City selected only one group, Christians, to support. Such a denomi-
184. Id. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973)).
185. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 15-16 for a further discussion
of Marsh.
186. Id. at 795. It seems clear that had the Marsh Court applied the Lemon test, the legisla-
ture's practice of opening sessions with a prayer would have been found violative because
prayers generally do not have a secular purpose. In addition, paying chaplains with public
funds would probably constitute an "excessive" entanglement between government and reli-
gion.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Marsh, stated "I have no doubt that, if any group of law
students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional." Id. at 800-01 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
187. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see, Fausto v. Diamond, 589
F. Supp. 451, 464 n.14 (D.R.I. 1984) ("That Lynch must be viewed as a landmark, not as an
aberration, is evident in light of Marsh v. Chambers .... which completely disregarded the
Lemon model.").
188. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
189. Id. at 255.
190. Id. at 246. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text discussing the strict scrutiny
test.
191. Larson, 456 U.S. at 252 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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national preference, it seems, should have required application of the
strict scrutiny test in Lynch. The majority dismissed this argument in a
footnote, concluding that the government's action was not discrimina-
tory.'92 Since the First Circuit based its affirmance of the district court
on a strict scrutiny theory, 93 the Court should have at least explained its
position more clearly for future actions. After Lynch, it is not certain
when strict scrutiny analysis is appropriate.
The Court held that the cr6eche must be viewed as part of the overall
display in the context of the Christmas season.1 94 Justice Brennan in
dissent argued that the majority was incorrect in focusing on the holiday
context. 195 In his view, as well as the district court's view, the creche has
inherent religious significance and, therefore, including it in a display did
not lessen the religious effect.196 This statement may be correct; how-
ever, it misses the point. If Christmas and the cr6che did not have any
religious significance, establishment clause analysis would not be neces-
sary. It is the fact that the creche has religious significance which re-
quires the Court to review the government's action. Once religious
significance is established, the Court must, as the Supreme Court major-
ity stated, focus on the cr6che in the context of the display and the
Christmas season which it celebrates.
197
The surrounding display does not lessen the religious significance of
the er6ehe; it merely changes the focus. For example, the religious signif-
icance of the Bible is not lessened in the context of a public school set-
ting. The question is whether there is a secular purpose for the use of the
Bible in public schools. Under the Lynch Court's analysis, if the Bible is
read as part of a literature course, its use probably would not violate the
establishment clause. However, if the Bible is read as part of a religious
activity, it would be violative. The public school setting does not "lessen
the religious effect" of the Bible; it merely changes the focus of the in-
quiry to the use of the Bible in the school.' 9 Similarly, a religious sym-
bol such as the cr6che must be viewed in the context of the entire
Christmas display of which it was a part.
192. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 n.13. The Court stated "[it is correct that we require strict
scrutiny of a statute or practice patently discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see
this display, or any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Lar-
son." Id. But see id. at 1375 n.ll (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with court of appeals that
Pawtucket cr6ehe failed strict scrutiny test).
193. Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1035.
194. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
195. Id. at 1375-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1168-70.
197. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
198. See supra note 75 discussing the Bible in public school settings.
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A. Secular Purpose
The Court stated that only when a governmental activity was "moti-
vated wholly by religious considerations" has the Court invalidated such
action based on lack of secular purpose.1 99 The Court found that there
were several nonreligious motivations for including the cr6che in the dis-
play and, therefore, the cr6che passed the secular purpose element of the
Lemon test.2°
The Court reasoned that since Christmas is a constitutionally ac-
cepted national holiday, official association with the sectarian aspects of
the holiday was also acceptable.20' Justice Brennan argued, however,
that the majority failed to appreciate the distinction between the secular
and religious aspects of Christmas, and that the Court in effect held that
all official association by government with the Christmas holiday is
acceptable.2 °2
In an effort to evaluate the City's actual purpose for including the
cr6ehe, the Court overlooked the district court's record. The trial record
revealed that the Mayor testified that he was strongly committed to
maintaining the cr6ehe.20 3 He claimed that the purpose of the entire
Christmas display was to promote goodwill and attract business in the
shopping district.2 4 While this may be true, it does not explain the pur-
pose for including the cr6eche in the display. As Justice Brennan noted in
dissent, the secular purpose of the entire display could have been
achieved without the cr6che. 20 5 However, the majority brushed this
aside as being irrelevant. 20 6 The Court found that there was a secular
purpose for including the cr6che because the creche depicted the histori-
cal origins of a "traditional event long recognized as a National
Holiday."
20 7
It seems clear that the City could not propose, and the Court could
not find, a legitimate secular purpose for including the cr6che in the dis-
play without ignoring its inherent religious significance and relegating it
199. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per
curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 223-24 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962)).
200. Id. at 1363.
201. Id. at 1365.
202. Id. at 1378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1154 n.3. The Mayor also indicated his intention to "'figure
some other way to have a nativity scene as part of the historical tradition and part of the full
Christmas display.'" Id.
204. Id. at 1158.
205. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1372 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 1363 n.7.
207. Id. at 1363.
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to one of the traditional symbols of the holiday. In effect, the Court
begged the question by eliminating any religious content in the creche.
Had it not done so, the Court would have been compelled to find that the
City's action did not pass the secular purpose element of the Lemon test.
B. Primary Effect
The Court's analysis of the primary effect question was equally non-
persuasive. It compared the beneficial effects of government action on
religion that previously were held nonviolative with the beneficial effects
of including the creche in the City's Christmas display. The Court noted
that this type of analysis was difficult to make.2 °8 It was difficult because
such a comparison does not elicit consistent results. The Court appar-
ently "weighed" the beneficial effects found in its prior cases against the
"weight" of the beneficial effect in the Lynch case. The Court stated that
to conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would
require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an en-
dorsement of religion, for example, than expenditure of large
sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the
country to students attending church-sponsored schools.209
Such a subjective "analysis" cannot possibly result in consistent applica-
tion of the primary effect test because courts will invariably decide on
differing "weights" depending on their subjective viewpoints.
The better approach would be to review the actual effect of the
cr6che in the City of Pawtucket. The district court reviewed this effect;
however, the Supreme Court did not give deference to the district court's
findings.
The testimony at the trial disclosed several views as to the effect of
the cr6che. A professor of philosophy stated that inclusion of the crehe
was "essential" in the display. Otherwise, "it would be like having a
birthday party without knowing whose birthday it was. ' '2 10 The Mayor
testified that the representative of at least one segment of the Jewish com-
munity in Pawtucket had called him to express support and to state that
they regarded the crgche as "a thing of joy and not a religious service or
208. Id.
209. Id. The Court made a similar comparison in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
"We conclude that legislative prayer presents no more potential for establishment than the
provision of school transportation ... beneficial grants for higher education,. . . or tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations. .. ." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (citations omitted).
210. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1160-61. David Freeman, a professor of philosophy at the
Univ. of Rhode Island, was an expert witness for the City.
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observance of any kind."2 1 ' A spokesman for the ACLU noted that
many callers felt that the ACLU was "'making a mountain out of a
molehill' and that some regarded the display as secular in nature.
' 212
However, in contrast, there was testimony by one of the plaintiffs
that his reaction to the creche was one of fear.213 Steve Brown, Execu-
tive Director of the ACLU, stated that he viewed the creche as represent-
ing "official sponsorship of a particular religious viewpoint.
214
In view of the evidence obtained at trial, the Court should have con-
cluded that inclusion of the creche had at least some effect of impermissi-
bly benefiting religion. Whether it was sufficient to confer a "substantial
and impermissible" benefit on religion is another subjective question.
However, absent a finding of clear error, the Court should have upheld
the district court's findings.
21 5
C. Entanglement
1. Administrative entanglement
The Court agreed with the district court's findings that administra-
tive entanglement did not exist.216 The cost to the City was minimal and
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities in the commu-
nity concerning the content or design of the cr6che.217 Justice Brennan
argued that inclusion of the crehe could result in administrative entan-
glement due to other religious groups wishing that their views be ex-
pressed or supported by the City.218 While this is a possibility, it does
not rise to the level of "excessive" government entanglement with reli-
gion which the Lemon test prohibits.
2. Political divisiveness
The Court stated that the political divisiveness question need not be
addressed unless a case involves a direct subsidy to church-sponsored
211. Id. at 1159. The Mayor also stated that it was his impression that people were shocked
and outraged over the lawsuit because it questioned what had been an accepted community
tradition for 40 years. Id. at 1158.
212. Id. at 1157. The trial court found that the phone calls and Letters to the Editor were
admissible under FED. R. EvID. 803(3) as an exception to the hearsay rule. The court then
found these statements and beliefs to be evidence of the "effect" which the cr~ehe had on the
people of Pawtucket. Id. at 1157 n.13.
213. Id. at 1156.
214. Id. at 1157.
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See infra note 231 stating the relevant part of Rule 52(a).
216. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
217. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1179.
218. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 161 discussing the
Mayor's statement concerning future displays.
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schools or colleges, or other religious institutions.2 9 Justice Brennan
argued that such a suggestion derives from "a distorted reading" of
Supreme Court precedent.220 Indeed, in Larson v. Valente,221 a case in-
volving the exemption of certain religious organizations from reporting
requirements, the Court applied the political divisiveness portion of the
test and found a violation based in part on the statute "engender[ing] a
risk of politicizing religion.
' 222
The district court approached this question by reviewing the "calm
history" of the Pawtucket cr6che, marked by no apparent dissension.223
However, it then turned to the community's reaction to the lawsuit and
determined that the calm history was "the product of a pragmatic calcu-
lation that enduring one religious symbol celebrating one Christian holi-
day was a small price to pay for harmony among the townspeople.
224
The Supreme Court stated that a litigant could not exploit the ap-
pearance of divisiveness caused by the filing of its lawsuit.225 However,
the Court did not support this statement with any legal argument. In
contrast, Justice Brennan agreed with the district court that any appear-
ance of political divisiveness could be used as evidence of
entanglement.226
Whether the political divisiveness element really adds anything to
the Lemon test is questionable. The Court noted that it has never held
that political divisiveness alone could serve to invalidate an otherwise
permissible government action.227 Justice O'Connor stated in her con-
curring opinion that political divisiveness should not be an independent
test of constitutionality. 228 Furthermore, many noted scholars have criti-
cized this analysis. "[T]he inconsistent and incoherent use and nonuse of
the political divisiveness test by the Supreme Court suggests that the util-
ity of this test as a tool of constitutional adjudication is dubious.
'229
219. Id. at 1364-65 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.ll (1983)).
220. Id. at 1374 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
222. Id. at 253.
223. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1179.
224. Id.
225. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
226. Id. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1364.
228. Id. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Justice Brennan's statement to same
effect, id. at 1374 n.9.
229. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 230. In addition, Professor Gaffney stated that the Court
should "abandon the political divisiveness test because the test is dysfunctional, illiberal, theo-
logically unsound, constitutionally impermissible, and historically erroneous." Id. at 236. See
also Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses--A Ten Year Assessment, 27
UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 866-67 (1978);
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D. Summary
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling and found
that a violation of the establishment clause had not occurred.230 Gener-
ally, the Court does not overturn a lower court's decision unless it finds
that decision to be clearly erroneous.231  Here, the Court stated that the
district court had "plainly erred" in its inference that, based on the reli-
gious significance of the cr6che, the City did not have a secular purpose
for the display.2 32 However, as Justice Brennan pointed out, detailed
findings of the district court may not be overturned unless clearly errone-
ous and the Court made "only a half-hearted attempt ... to grapple with
[this] fact."
233
In sum, the Court was faced with a dilemma. It appears that a ma-
jority of the Justices felt that inclusion of the creche in the Christmas
display was not so offensive as to violate the Constitution.234 However,
the district court had thoroughly reviewed the issue and, based on the
Lemon test, concluded that the City had violated the establishment
clause.2 35 The Supreme Court was left with three options: (1) to let the
decision stand, although not agreeing with the result, (2) to reverse the
lower courts and change the application of the Lemon test, or (3) to find
the district court had clearly erred. Since the Court recently had been
criticized for disrupting the longstanding establishment clause analysis in
Marsh v. Chambers2 36 and Larson v. Valente,237 the Court used a "less
than vigorous application of the Lemon test 238 to find that the district
court had erred.
Perhaps Justice Brennan recognized the problem in Lynch when he
stated: "I am convinced that this case appears hard not because the prin-
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L.
REV. 673 (1980).
230. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366.
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a) states in relevant part: "Findings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
232. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
233. Id. at 1375 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations to majority opinion omitted).
234. Justice Brennan stated that "[a]lthough the Court's relaxed application of the Lemon
test to Pawtucket's cr6eche is regrettable, it is at least understandable and properly limited to
the particular facts of this case." Id. at 1380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1181.
236. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (application of an "historical analysis" type of approach). See
supra text accompanying notes 15-16 discussing historical analysis.
237. 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (strict scrutiny test applicable to actions which discriminate
among religions). See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text discussing strict scrutiny
analysis.
238. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ciples of decision are obscure, but because the Christmas holiday seems
so familiar and agreeable.
2 39
VI. PROPOSED CATEGORIES
Until recently, the Lemon test was the only test for establishment
clause analysis.2 ' However, application of the test has often resulted in
inconsistent decisions. A review of the application of the test in Lynch v.
Donnelly241 proves this point. The Supreme Court reversed the district
court, not based on a misapplication of the law, but because it interpreted
the facts and applied them to the Lemon test differently than the district
court. The Court found that the district court had "plainly erred" in
applying a relatively subjective test.242 It held that the court of appeals
did not apply the "correct" test-it used the strict scrutiny test.
243
Obviously there is confusion in the courts as to when to use the
Lemon or strict scrutiny tests and when to disregard both tests and apply
an historical analysis. 2 4 The reasons for such confusion are several.
A. Reasons for Inconsistent Results
The most obvious reason why application of the Lemon test has re-
sulted in inconsistent decisions is the difficulty inherent in the subject
matter. As stated by Justice Powell, the establishment clause concerns
"some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court. ' 245 It
is difficult for government to avoid aiding religion in some manner unless
it actually opposes religion; however, this is forbidden by the free exercise
clause.2 46 The Court has tried to find a neutral course between the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses; unfortunately, the Lemon test has
failed to provide such a course.
There are several problems with the Lemon test. One problem is
that if read literally, it is inflexible. In an effort to avoid the inflexibility
239. Id. at 1371 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
240. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text discussing the use of the Lemon test.
241. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 232-33 discussing the clearly erroneous standard.
243. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1034-35 (1st Cir. 1982).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 5-16 & 179-82 and accompanying text concerning
the confusion over the correct test.
245. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
Similarly, in discussing the difficulty in resolving establishment clause cases, Circuit Judge
Tamm stated that "[t]his case, we unhappily anthropomorphize, is similarly disposed to per-
plex, confuse, and even frustrate, so sensitive and complex are the issues it presents." Allen v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 47-59 discussing the conflict between the religion
clauses.
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and the strict obstacle that the Lemon test has become, the Supreme
Court has formulated additional tests. 47 Chief Justice Burger disagrees
with the application of the Lemon test as a strict obstacle. As stated in
Tilton v. Richardson:
4 8
There are always risks in treating criteria discussed by the
Court from time to time as "tests" in any limiting sense of that
term. Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the ab-
solutes of the physical sciences or mathematics. The standards
should rather be viewed as guidelines with which to identify
instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses have
been impaired. 49
In addition to the inflexibility of the Lemon test, its application has
generally been limited to religion and education cases.2 50 This has
caused difficulty when the lower courts have attempted to apply the test
to noneducational questions. For example, in Bogen v. Doty,2 51 where
the issue was whether a county board violated the establishment clause
by opening each board meeting with a prayer, Chief Judge Gibson for the
Eighth Circuit stated: "[T]he District Court reviewed several of the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court touching on the establishment clause. How-
ever, it found no specific guidance in those cases or the Constitution.
2 2
Similarly, in Allen v. Morton, 53 the question concerned a creche on fed-
eral parkland in the government's annual Christmas Pageant of Peace in
Washington, D.C. The court stated that "the involvement we consider
here today is novel in terms of Supreme Court precedent and thus does
not fit well in the pigeonholes of past decisions.
254
The Supreme Court has also found application of the Lemon test
somewhat difficult in noneducational cases. Thus, in Marsh v. Cham-
bers,2 5 the Court used a new historical analysis approach without even
mentioning the Lemon test256 and, in Larson v. Valente, 57 it developed
247. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text discussing the various tests.
248. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
249. Id. at 678.
250. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973)
(most establishment clause cases involve religion and education).
251. 598 F.2d 1110, 1112 (8th Cir. 1979).
252. Id. The district court "concluded, on the basis of 'history and custom,' that [prayer at
county board meetings] did not pose a threat to the first amendment provisions, nor was it
violative thereof." Id.
253. 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
254. Id. at 75.
255. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
256. Id. at 786-95.
257. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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the strict scrutiny test for certain religion clause cases.258
Another problem with the Lemon test is that in its short twenty year
history, it has been expanded, rephrased and reemphasized by the Court.
This again has been due to the difficulty in the application of the test.
For example, the "primary effect" language has been construed to mean
"a" primary effect as well as "the" primary effect. Chief Justice Burger
stated in Tilton v. Richardson,259 that "[t]he crucial question is not
whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence
of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect ad-
vances religion."" Conversely, in Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,261 the Court stated "this section has a pri-
mary effect that advances religion." 62 While this may appear to be a
mere technicality, it can change the outcome of a case since a govern-
mental action can have several effects; however, the principal effect of
such action need not advance religion.
For example, in Mueller v. Allen,263 a Minnesota statute allowed tax
deductions for certain expenses incurred in educating children. Of the
five hundred privately supported schools located in Minnesota, approxi-
mately ninety-five percent were sectarian. Even though expenses in-
curred in sending children to public school are minimal, and the tax
deduction clearly benefits parents sending their children to sectarian
schools, the Supreme Court upheld the statute.2" The Court found that
while a primary effect of the statute was a tax benefit for those children
attending sectarian schools, the primary effect was a facially neutral stat-
ute which provided tax benefits to all persons educating children in
Minnesota.2 65 If the Court had looked at only one of the primary ef-
fects-tax benefits for children in sectarian schools-the Court would
have invalidated the statute.
In addition to the primary effect element, the excessive entangle-
ment element has also been rephrased and reemphasized. Prior to
Lemon, excessive entanglement actually was a part of the primary effect
element. In Walz v. Tax Commission,266 the Court announced the effect
test: "[w]e must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an
258. Id. at 246.
259. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
260. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
261. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
262. Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
263. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
264. Id. at 396.
265. Id. at 397.
266. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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excessive government entanglement with religion."2 67  However, exces-
sive entanglement became a separate test after Walz and has been criti-
cized as being a subjective 268 and inefficient 269 test. In addition, it is seen
as a Catch-22. The Court insists that recipient sectarian schools continu-
ally report to the government in order to insure neutrality. Yet, this con-
tinual reporting and "surveillance" invalidates the program because it
creates "excessive entanglement." Such reasoning is clearly circular.270
The political divisiveness portion of the entanglement element has
drawn additional criticism.271 The Court stated in a footnote in Mueller
v. Allen27 2 that the element should be used only in "cases where direct
financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in paro-
chial schools." 273 Yet, political divisiveness was used to strike down a
Massachusetts statute governing the issuance of liquor licenses within
five hundred feet of a church or school in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 274
A noted constitutional law scholar has stated that the political divisive-
ness test has merely shifted the focus in aid to parochial school cases.2 75
By prohibiting neutral aid to religious schools, religious groups will be
forced to oppose aid to public schools in an effort to indirectly benefit the
parochial schools. Such action will cause new forms of political divisive-
ness along religious lines.276
267. Id. at 674.
268. Ripple, supra note 229, at 1218.
In short, by requiring the Justices to predict the probability of unconstitutional effect,
the entanglement test has introduced an abnormally high degree of judicial subjectiv-
ity into the Court's assessment of the nature of religious institutions and of the rela-
tionships which those institutions develop with governmental entities. The degree of
entanglement deemed "excessive" often appears to be the product of personal judg-
ments about certain religions and their institutions by a decision-maker who may or
may not have any real exposure to the particular sect in question. The Justices have
often based their conclusions on factual assumptions upon which the record is either
silent or to the contrary.
Id. (emphasis in original).
269. Id. at 1216. "Even if the Court is willing to accept the policy directions to which [the
entanglement test] leads, a test not susceptible to fair and moderately efficient judicial manage-
ment is a poor candidate for retention and a substitute must be sought." Id.
270. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1047 (2d ed. 1983).
271. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text discussing criticism of the political divi-
siveness element of the Lemon test.
272. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
273. Id. at 403-04 n.ll.
274. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). "The challenged statute thus enmeshes churches in the processes
of government and creates the danger of '[political fragmentation and divisiveness along reli-
gious lines.'" Id. at 127 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971)).
275. Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Educa-
tion, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 883 (1976).
276. Id. at 907. This shift will continue further if the government tries to aid nonreligious
private schools in an attempt to promote an alternative to the public school system. Religious
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Another reason for inconsistent results arises from the fact that all
establishment clause cases are grouped together, whether they concern
subsidies to parochial schools, prayer in public schools or tax exemptions
for religious organizations.
The uniform treatment of all establishment clause cases has caused
the courts to lose sight of these different concerns. For example, in the
public school area, the primary concern is to prevent the imposition of
any type of religious activity upon young schoolchildren. However, in
the nonpublic school area, the main concern is with tax expenditures or
governmental involvement in religion. In these cases, the courts must be
careful not to infringe on freedom of religion, while at the same time not
"establish" a religion.
Recently, the courts have been faced with cases such as Marsh v.
Chambers,77 which appear to be outside the realm of precedent. Instead
of struggling to apply the Lemon test, which did not appear to address
the concerns in Marsh, the Court developed the new historical analysis
test. As stated by the Solicitor General in his brief in Marsh, "[i]n these
circumstances, analysis of the legislative chaplaincy practice under the
Lemon test seems pointless." '
B. Possible Solution
One way to achieve more consistent results would be to categorize
the establishment clause cases and apply tests which meet the concerns of
each category. This categorization would be somewhat analogous to the
categorization used in the equal protection area.
In equal protection analysis, the Court has developed three basic
tests. Strict scrutiny review is used when a law impinges on a fundamen-
tal right or is based on a suspect classification, such as race,279 national
origin2 80 or alienage.281 Intermediate scrutiny is used when a law is
groups will then be forced to oppose aid to both nonsectarian private schools and public
schools. Id. at 907-08.
277. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
278. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22, Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
279. See, eg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute prohibiting marriage between
whites and nonwhites held unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(separate but equal doctrine rejected as to public education).
280. See, eg., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (discrimination against Mexican.
Americans with regard to jury service held unconstitutional).
281. See, eg., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (federal law discriminating against
aliens held constitutional); but see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state law
discriminating against aliens held unconstitutional).
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based on a quasi-suspect classification, such as illegitimacy 282 or gen-
der.283 The third test is the rational basis analysis which is used when a
law is discriminatory but need not meet the higher standards of the sus-
pect or quasi-suspect classification, such as most social and economic
regulations.284 By categorizing the types of governmental discrimina-
tion, the Court is able to apply various tests appropriate to the specific
areas of concern.
The establishment clause cases appear to fall within four categories:
public schools, nonpublic schools, status quo and governmental regula-
tion of religious organizations.
1. Public schools
The primary factual issues in this area involve statutes or govern-
ment practices which cause the government to become actively involved
in religion. The Court's primary concerns focus on the potential indirect
coercive effect of these statutes and government practices upon children
to conform to the government's approved religion.285 Coercion is partic-
ularly important in regard to young schoolchildren, as opposed to college
students.28 6 While the Court has stated that coercion is really only a
factor in free exercise clause cases, and is not a factor in establishment
clause cases,287 in the public school area coercion seems to be the under-
lying concern. For example, although a statute may make school prayer
voluntary, the Court is inclined to believe that it has the indirect coercive
effect of compelling small children to conform.288 Justice Frankfurter
282. See, eg., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (state statute concerning inheritance by
illegitimate children upheld).
283. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state statute forbidding the sale of 3.2%
beer to males aged 18 to 20 held unconstitutional).
284. See, eg., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (classifica-
tion of railroad employees based on length of employment held rationally related to statutory
purpose of insuring solvency of railroad retirement system); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (Maryland welfare program which set the maximum payment of $250 regardless of
family size or need, upheld because rationally related to state's interest in encouraging
employment).
285. See, eg., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coer-
cive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion
is plain.").
286. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (University students "are
less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the Univer-
sity's policy is one of neutrality toward religion.").
287. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) ("[A] violation of the Free
Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be
so attended.").
288. See, eg., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam). In Stone, the Court
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stated in his concurring opinion in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of
Education:2 9 "The law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not
an outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious pres-
sure upon children to [conform]."' ' 0
The test which should be used in public school cases can be confined
to the first two elements of the Lemon test: secular purpose and primary
effect. The Court should give deference to the stated legislative pur-
pose l because not all religious references in public schools are unconsti-
tutional. For example, religious art and literature may be studied if their
purpose is purely academic. However, while the purpose of a program
may be a neutral or secular one, if the effect of the practice is to give
governmental support to the advancement of religious beliefs, the prac-
tice would constitute a violation.
In analyzing the principal effect of a governmental action, the Court
should focus on the concerns particular to public school cases. The
Court should review whether the primary effect, not a remote or inciden-
tal effect, advances or inhibits religion.192 The effect should not be to
indirectly coerce schoolchildren into following a particular religious
practice. However, the focus should not be so narrow as to foreclose all
struck down a Kentucky statute requiring that the Ten Commandments be posted in public
schools. The Court stated that the posted copies would have the effect of "inducing] the
schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments."
Id.
289. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (release of children from public school to attend religious program
given on school premises found unconstitutional).
290. Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, 3., concurring). See also Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306
(1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld a program where students were released from public
schools so that they could receive religious instruction off the school's premises. Id. at 315. If
such a program had indirectly coerced students into attending the religious classes, the govern-
mental action would have been a direct violation of both the establishment and free exercise
clauses. Id. at 314.
291. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). But see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41 (1980) (per curiam).
In Stone, the legislature clearly stated a secular purpose for the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in the public schools. The statute provided in part:
(2) In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation concerning
the purpose of the display, as follows: "The secular application of the Ten Com-
mandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western
Civilization and the Common Law of the United States."
Stone, 449 U.S. at 39-40 n.1.
Although the legislature stated a secular purpose, the Court found that "[t]he pre-eminent
purpose ... is plainly religious in nature." Id. at 41. The Court could have based the violation
on the primary effect test, thereby giving deference to the legislative purpose.
292. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-50 (1961) (Sunday closing laws found
to have only a remote and incidental effect advantageous to religion and therefore not
violative).
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religious references. As stated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting
opinion in Stone v. Graham, "'I should suppose it is a proper, if not an
indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the roles that
religions have played in the tragic story of mankind.' ,293
2. Nonpublic schools
The focus in the nonpublic school area is very different from the
public school area. In nonpublic school cases, the Court tries to avoid
the appearance of advancing religion where the nonpublic schools receive
public financial support. In addition, the free exercise clause takes on a
more substantial role in this area by preventing the government from
inhibiting religious freedom in the nonpublic schools. In analyzing legis-
lation in this area, the Court has considered several factors.
Initially, the particular form of aid given to a nonpublic school is
important. Aid given directly to the students or parents-rather than
the religious institution itself-often is upheld. The Court distinguished
the state aid in Lemon v. Kurtzman with that upheld in Everson v. Board
of Education294 and Board of Education v. Allen 29' by stating that, in
those prior cases, "state aid was provided to the student and his par-
ents-not to the church-related school.,
296
Another important concern is whether the aid is given to a broad
class of beneficiaries. In Mueller v. Allen,2 97 the Court distinguished the
aid struck down in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist 298 by stating that in comparison, the Minnesota tax deduction
"permits all parents-whether their children attend public school or pri-
vate-to deduct their children's educational expenses." '2 9 9 It found that
a program "that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum
293. Stone, 449 U.S. at 46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois ex rel McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
294. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
295. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
296. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621 (1971). See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 399 (1983) ("the means by which state assistance flows to private schools is of some
importance"); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253 (1977) (per curiam) (field trip transporta-
tion aids the school rather than the children and "this fact alone may be sufficient to invalidate
the program as impermissible direct aid"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973) ("fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the
schools is only one among many factors to be considered").
297. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
298. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
299. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398 (emphasis in original). In Nyquist, the Court distinguished
Allen and Everson. "In both cases the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren, those
in public as well as those in private schools." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38 (emphasis in
original).
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of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause.
,,13
°
The Court is also concerned with whether the aid can be limited to
only the secular aspects of the nonpublic school. If the religious institu-
tion is "pervasively sectarian," the secular program must be capable of
being separated out of the sectarian program. °1 In this regard, the Court
looks at the type of institution aided. Although secondary schools are
considered to be "pervasively sectarian," colleges are not. This is be-
cause elementary and secondary schools are generally under more reli-
gious control than the nonpublic colleges.3 °2 Whether the institution is
pervasively sectarian or not, the concern is whether the aid directly bene-
fits the secular, not sectarian, aspects of the institution.
Another concern follows directly from the issue of whether the aid
will benefit only the secular aspects of an institution. The Court is also
wary of the amount of "surveillance" needed to keep secular and sectar-
ian programs apart. As stated in Walz v. Tax Commission,30 3 there are
"programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the State in details of
administration." 3" Some surveillance of, or entanglement in, nonpublic
schools is constitutional. For example, regulating nonpublic schools so
that minimum educational standards are met, such as "competent teach-
ers, accreditation of the school for diplomas, the number of hours of
work and credits allowed," would be constitutional. 30 5  However, the
Court has found other programs to be "fraught with the sort of entangle-
ment that the Constitution forbids.
'30 6
In Lemon, the Court found the Rhode Island program of supple-
menting the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools
to be unconstitutional because such a program would require extensive
300. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398-99.
301. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state aid for construction of secular building at
Baptist college held unconstitutional).
302. In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), the Court noted that the
"character-of-institution" distinctions in Lemon were important:
The elementary and secondary schooling in Lemon I came at an impressionable age;
the aided schools were "under the general supervision" of the Roman Catholic dio-
cese; each school had a local Catholic parish that assumed "ultimate financial re-
sponsibility" for it; the principals of the schools were usually appointed by church
authorities; religion "pervade[d] the school system"; teachers were specifically in-
structed by the "Handbook of School Regulations" that "'[r]eligious formation is
not confined to formal courses; nor is it restricted to a single subject area.'"
Id. at 764-65 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617-18).
303. 397 U.S. at 664 (1970).
304. Id. at 695.
305. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 631 (Douglas, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 620.
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reporting and auditing. "A comprehensive, discriminating, and continu-
ing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these re-
strictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected.
'30 7
Other factors deemed relevant by the Court are whether the pro-
gram is mandated and controlled by the state3 8 and whether the aid is a
one-time, single-purpose grant or continuing aid.30 9 In Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,31° tests were mandated
and controlled by the state. The Court stated that "[tjhe nonpublic
school thus has no control whatsoever over the content of the tests."31
In contrast, in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty312 where state-mandated tests were prepared by nonpublic school
teachers, the Court stated that there were no means available "to assure
that internally prepared tests [were] free of religious instruction."
'3 13
In Tilton v. Richardson,31 4 the Court found that government entan-
glement was reduced when the aid was a "one-time, single-purpose con-
struction grant," as opposed to "direct and continuing payments" which
require "regulation and surveillance. "315
The test which should be used in the nonpublic school area can also
be confined to the first two elements of the Lemon test. This would in-
clude reviewing excessive entanglement as a possible effect under the pri-
mary effect element. As in the public school area, the courts should give
deference to the stated legislative purpose. 6 Legislatures are thought to
be in a better position than the courts to understand the school systems
in their states and to determine when aid is needed.
The primary effect issue is important in this area. Legislation which
only has "a remote and incidental effect" that benefits religious organiza-
tions should not be struck down. The establishment clause is concerned
with legislation which has the principal effect of advancing religion.317
Moreover, the courts must not inhibit religion, which would include dis-
307. Id. at 619.
308. See, ag., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980).
309. See, eg., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
310. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
311. Id. at 654. In addition, there was "no substantial risk that the examinations could be
used for religious educational purposes." Id. at 656.
312. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
313. Id. at 480.
314. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
315. Id. at 688.
316. See supra note 291 and accompanying text discussing the role of legislative purposes.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 260-65 discussing the difference between "a" pri-
mary effect and "the" primary effect.
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advantaging nonpublic schools to the benefit of public schools. For ex-
ample, state-mandated tests for all schoolchildren, nonpublic and public,
should be paid for by the state. If not, the nonpublic schools will be at a
distinct disadvantage to public schools. In addition, entanglement
should be considered as one effect of the legislation. If the primary effect
is excessive government entanglement, the program should be struck
down. Requiring reporting to assure neutrality should not be viewed as
"excessive" entanglement. If entanglement is merely one effect, but not
the primary effect, such legislation should be upheld.
As stated previously, the courts should review the legislation with
the concerns of the nonpublic schools in mind. Additionally, the actual,
factual results or effects of legislation-not potential harm-should be
reviewed by the courts. Further, the courts should not assume problems
not in the factual record. As stated by Justice Marshall in Wolman v.
Walter,318 the harm which the Court is concerned with does not include
"imaginable but totally implausible evils." '3 19
3. Status quo
The focus in this area is on particular practices which have been a
part of the history of a community or the United States for many years,
and whether such practices should be retained or eliminated. These
cases have shown that the Court's concern is whether the practice ad-
vances religion, rather than concern over whether a practice inhibits reli-
gion. For example, in Marsh v. Chambers,320 the governmental action at
issue was the prayer that opened each session of the Nebraska legislature.
This had been an ongoing practice for more than a century. 32' The
Supreme Court found that this practice resulted in no advancement of
religion and, thus, no violation of the establishment clause.322 The Court
based its decision on a purely historical analysis.
3 2
The Lemon test is not helpful in this area because it was developed
based on the concerns in the public and private school areas and does not
address concerns which are purely historical. The government actions in
both Marsh and Lynch v. Donnelly should have been found to violate the
establishment clause based on the Lemon test. However, the Court ap-
peared to be of the opinion that the governmental practices in those cases
318. 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (per curiam).
319. Id. at 260 n.6 (1977) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
320. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
321. Id. at 795.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 786-95.
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had been a part of our society for decades and the "status quo" should be
preserved.
An historical analysis test should be applied in this area. As stated
by Justice Holmes, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." '324
However, as the Court has also noted, "no one acquires a vested or pro-
tected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that
span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates
it.",325
In order to meet the historical analysis test, the Court "must con-
sider both the actual impact of the practice in modem society as well as
the historical basis for the activity., 3 26 Incidental benefit to religious in-
stitutions in today's society should be upheld. For example, in McGowan
v. Maryland,327 Sunday closing laws were upheld even though some inci-
dental benefits were recognized by some religious groups. 328 Only prac-
tices which directly and substantially benefit religion should be struck
down.
In addition to reviewing the actual impact of the governmental ac-
tivity in today's society, the record must be supported by evidence of
historical acceptance. In Walz v. Tax Commission,329 the Court upheld
tax exempt status for religious institutions. The historical record showed
"an unbroken practice of according the exemption to churches, openly
and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction. ' 330 As
was noted previously, the historical review should be of the particular
practice at issue. Because the history of public endorsement of Christ-
mas as a religious holiday is sketchy at best, the City of Pawtucket's
inclusion of the cr6che in its Christmas display may have been disallowed
under the historical analysis as well.331
324. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970) (citing New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
325. Id. at 678.
326. Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1113 (1979) (opening invocation at county board meet-
ings not violative of establishment clause). In looking at the actual impact of the governmental
action in Wa/z, the Court stated that "[i]f tax exemption can be seen as this first step toward
'establishment' of religion, as Mr. Justice Douglas fears, the second step has been long in
coming." Walz, 397 U.S. at 678.
327. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
328. Id. at 445.
329. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
330. Id. at 678. Additionally, the Court noted that "[n]early 50 years ago Mr. Justice
Holmes stated: 'If a thing has been practised [sic] for two hundred years by common consent,
it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.'" Id. (citing Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922)).
33 1. See supra notes 107 & 175 discussing the various views on the history of Christmas in
the United States.
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4. Government regulation of religious organizations
The final category of establishment clause cases concerns govern-
ment regulation of religious organizations. While this category only in-
cludes a few Supreme Court cases at present, the potential for further
government regulation in this area is highly probable. The existing con-
cerns are denominational preference and discretionary powers given to
religious organizations.
In Larson v. Valente,332 the Court struck down a statute which
granted a denominational preference and, in effect, discriminated be-
tween religious organizations. 333 The statute originally exempted all reli-
gious organizations from certain reporting and registration requirements.
It was then amended to exempt only religious organizations which re-
ceived more than half of their contributions from members. The effect of
the amendment was to require only certain religious organizations to reg-
ister. Using strict scrutiny, the Court found that the statute did not fur-
ther any compelling governmental interest and, therefore, the
denominational preference was held invalid under the establishment
clause.334
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,3 the Court struck down a statute
which gave churches or schools discretionary veto power over restaurant
applications for liquor licenses.336 The Court noted that ordinarily this
type of power is vested in agencies of government.337 The Court found
that while the statute had a secular purpose, it also had a primary effect
of advancing religion. 338 Additionally, it found that the statute "en-
meshes churches in the processes of government," entanglement which is
offensive to the Constitution.339
This kind of government regulation of religious institutions should
be analyzed using strict scrutiny. There must be a compelling govern-
mental interest justifying the statute and the statute must be closely fitted
to further that interest.34  The reason for the strict scrutiny analysis in
Larson was due to the discriminatory effect of the statute. In Larkin,
while there is no discriminatory effect, the statute gives the religious or-
ganizations power normally vested in the government. Such delegation
332. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
333. Id. at 255.
334. Id.
335. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
336. Id. at 127.
337. Id. at 122 (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972)).
338. Id. at 125-26.
339. Id. at 127.
340. See supra notes 11-14 discussing strict scrutiny analysis.
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of power should be supported by a compelling reason. If the same effect
can be accomplished without such discrimination or delegation of power,
the statute should be invalidated.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is virtually undisputed that the establishment clause prohibits the
establishment of one national religion. Moreover, government must be
careful not to interfere with the free exercise of religion. Thus, it cannot
endorse nor can it disapprove any particular religion. Beyond that, how-
ever, the reality is such that religious organizations and religious schools
are important in today's society and cannot exist without some interac-
tion with government. How much or how little interaction is permissible
is difficult to answer. The Supreme Court has attempted to draw the line
by comparison with prior cases or by reflecting back at how society ex-
isted during the First Congress when the religion clauses were enacted.
While these methods may shed some light on the answer, the results have
been far from conclusive or consistent.
Categorizing establishment clause cases could lead to more consis-
tent decisions by providing more structure and guidelines. By looking at
the concerns in one area, instead of the concerns of all establishment
clause cases, the courts will be able to focus more clearly on the issues in
a particular case. Perhaps the confusion surrounding the proper test to
be applied in Lynch v. Donnelly could have been avoided by using such a
categorization.
Nancy Blyth Hersman
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